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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we investigate cyber breaches and their effects on 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs), considering the role that 
cybersecurity plays in SMEs, and the importance that SMEs have 
in the economy. Using the Cyber Security Breaches Survey data, the 
first contribution extends previous works confirming that SMEs 
receive a wide variety of breaches. Secondly, we have characterized 
the degree of severity of breaches in SMEs, based on disruption 
time and their cost. Our last contribution consists of determining 
the effect and severity of breaches in SMEs in terms of economic, 
financial and management impacts.
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1. Introduction
The study of cyber breaches and their effect on companies has become a critical element 
in businesses’ strategic management (Lezoche and Panetto 2020; Ashibani et al., 2017; 
Chronopoulos, Panaousis, and Grossklags 2018; Fielder, 2016). This is because, not only 
does the impact of an attack affect a company in terms of information systems (IS), but 
also the protection of cybersecurity is increasingly highlighted in terms of business 
continuity, company reputation, repercussions to supply chains, as well as legal implica-
tions. Moreover, companies are developing indicators and metrics for assessing their level 
of protection and the probability of suffering a cyber breach as an element that has 
a significant impact on the economic and financial reputation of the business1 (see, for 
example, Pirounias, Mermigas, and Patsakis 2014).
In this context, the literature has addressed the analysis of breaches generated in 
companies, as well as the effect on those companies (Heartfield et al. 2018; Conteh and 
Schmick 2016; Gatrner Group 2014). Despite these important contributions, the relation-
ship between breaches and their potential impact on companies has generated diverse 
and inconclusive results (see, for example, Couce-Vieira, Insua, and Kosgodagan 2020). 
This is due to several reasons. First, it is problematic to identify breaches in companies 
(Bland et al. 2020; Wang and Zhang 2020; Seibold et al. 2020; Sahoo and Gupta 2019; 
Heartfield et al. 2018; Choo 2011). Most of the existing research has focused on 
CONTACT Juan Carlos Fernandez de Arroyabe jcfern@essex.ac.uk Essex Business School, University of Essex, 
Elmer Approach, Southend-on-Sea, UK
ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS                 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17517575.2021.1942997
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any med-
ium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
investigating a certain typology of attacks and on studying cases of companies, without 
considering a wider spectrum of possible types of attacks that companies may receive 
(Garre, Pérez, and Ruiz-Martínez 2021; Dahiya and Gupta 2020). Second, the study of 
cyber-breach impact has been limited to a purely technical and operational aspect, with 
few studies that have considered other types of impacts on companies (for example, 
economic, financial and management) (Couce-Vieira, Insua, and Kosgodagan 2020). This 
has occurred due to the low permeability of cybersecurity management in companies,2 
which, derived from its complexity and technical specificity, makes it difficult for company 
managers to get involved (Ahmad et al. 2019; Cavusoglu et al. 2015; Srinidhi, Yan, and Tayi 
2015).
In this paper, we will investigate this gap, studying cyber breaches and their impact on 
companies. To do this, we make various assumptions in terms of defining the framework 
of our research. First, we assume that there is a wide spectrum of cyber breaches in 
companies, and, therefore, variability in the types of effect they produce. Unlike previous 
studies, the methodology followed in this paper is based on the statistical analysis of the 
types of breaches and their effect on companies. Second, we will study the case of small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), covering a gap in the literature that has mainly 
focused on large companies (Ponsard, Grandclaudon, and Dallons 2018; Osborn 2015; 
Valli, Martinus, and Johnstone 2014; Hayes and Bodhani 2013). SMEs are known to play 
a key role in the global economy. For example, in European countries, they employ two 
thirds of the workforce and generate around 60% of the GDP (Müller, Buliga, and Voigt 
2018). Moreover, SMEs have had little coverage in terms of cybersecurity compared with 
large companies (Osborn 2015), even though approximately 72% of breaches occur in 
SMEs (Fielder et al. 2016). These attacks, depending on the severity, generate disruptions 
in SMEs, which can affect business operations and prevent staff from carrying out their 
daily work, to the extent that 60% of small companies cannot maintain their business six 
months after a cyberattack (Aguilar 2015). Third, this paper conducts a cause-effect 
analysis from a methodological point of view (Somya Sahoo and Gupta 2019). To do 
this, using artificial neural networks (ANNs) for the prediction and simulation, we establish 
the relationship between breaches and their effects in SMEs. Machine learning methodol-
ogy permits the analysing of multiple business and management research questions, in 
which the multiplicity of interactions and complexity are their main characteristics (Arranz 
and Fernandez de Arroyabe 2010; Somers and Casal 2009). This is the case in the manage-
ment of cybersecurity in companies, in which the breaches have multiple consequences 
for these companies, involving multiple interactions between variables (Couce-Vieira, 
Insua, and Kosgodagan 2020). Moreover, previous studies on cybersecurity in companies 
relied on survey data, which is characterised by a low response rate, because of the 
difficulty of identifying both attacks and threats and the impact on companies (Cyber 
Security Breaches Survey 2017). In this sense, the use of methods with a high level of 
robustness, such as machine learning ones, allows us to build a causal relationship in 
cases with a low response (Minbashian, Bright, and Bird 2010; Somers and Casal 2009).
Therefore, our research question investigates breaches and their effects on SMEs. To do 
this, we will first analyse the severity of breaches in SMEs. After characterising the typology 
of the breaches, we will consider their degree of severity, measuring them in terms of 
disruption time and estimated cost for the companies. The first question (RQ1) is: How do 
breaches affect SMEs in terms of severity? Second, we will establish a causal relationship 
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between breaches and their effects on SMEs. Unlike previous works, which have focused 
exclusively on the results of breaches, in terms of damage to software or the destruction 
and alteration of data (Dahiya and Gupta 2020), we consider that SMEs have both the 
capacity to react and decide on when they face breaches. Following Couce-Vieira, Insua, 
and Kosgodagan (2020), the impact of breaches will not only be analysed in terms of 
damage to the information system (IS) infrastructure but also in terms of the economic, 
financial and management impact for SMEs. Therefore, our second research question 
(RQ2) is: What is the impact of breaches in SMEs? For the empirical study, we make use of 
the Cyber Security Breaches Survey data, which collects information on the management 
of cybersecurity in UK companies (Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2016, 2017). This survey 
contains data on the breaches suffered by companies, the security measures they used, as 




Information system (IS) security can be defined as a set of measures, strategies and 
methodologies targeted at alleviating the risks and vulnerabilities of the information 
systems (ISO/IEC 2014; CLUSIF 2008). Organizations make use of IS security to prevent 
or minimise the impact of attacks3 and threats on the IS. The ENISA (2018) defines a cyber 
breach as a violation of the security policy of a system to affect its integrity or availability, 
leading to unauthorised access or attempted access to a system.
The typology of breaches is very diverse considering the variety of attacks that 
companies can receive. We can find a wide typology of attacks, as these are intensifying, 
diversifying and becoming more sophisticated (Mendhurwar and Mishra 2019; Contech 
and Schimick, 2016; Mallinder and Drabwell 2014). Moreover, the ways in which cyber-
attacks occur are varied, depending on the objectives, who produces them or the method 
of execution. In general, in the literature, we can find external attacks carried out by 
different types of adversaries,4 from phishing, malware or web attacks, to the exploitation 
of vulnerabilities derived from the incorrect use of IS in the company. For example, the 
latest ENISA report identifies 15 categories of attacks and breaches for cyberspace (ENISA 
2020), among which the following stand out: 1) malware or malicious software, which is 
responsible for 30% of all registered cyberattacks, with consequent damage to the 
operation of the companies’ IS; 2) attacks on websites and domains, aiming to steal 
personal information or bank details from users; 3) phishing, which is widely used and 
seeks to supplant identity (of a trusted or legitimate third party) in order to both steal 
personal information and deploy malware; and 4) data breaches, which are the result of 
cyberattacks that lead to the loss or theft of data. In addition to these external attacks, we 
must consider the insider threat, which can come from the misuse that the company’s staff 
makes of the IS, either voluntarily or involuntarily, causing a security breach. ENISA (2020) 
highlights the importance of this type of threat, noting that 77% of company data 
breaches are caused by internal threats.
Moreover, in addition to the typology of breaches, a complete characterisation of them 
in terms of their effect on companies requires the analysing of the frequency of their 
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occurrence. At first sight, a more exposed company will receive more attacks and, as 
a consequence, greater potential damage to the company is to be expected; however, this 
is not always the case. CLUSIF (2008) point out that while approximately 80% of breaches 
exploit common vulnerabilities, only 5% to 10% of the attacks present serious risks for 
organisations (Gatrner Group 2014). Moreover, Cohen (1997) and Choo (2011) pointed out 
that the most infrequent attacks are those that do the most damage to companies. 
Therefore, this means variability in effects on organisations, considering both the degree 
of exposure of the company and the severity of the breaches. Jeong, Lee, and Lim (2019) 
point out that organisations could reduce the investment in security systems by assessing 
and ranking the frequency and severity of the risks.
2.2 SMEs and cybersecurity
The internet has become the most important asset of SMEs for their businesses (Müller, 
Buliga, and Voigt 2018). Thus, SMEs develop their businesses through the internet, which, 
together with the main characteristics of SMEs, such as a high degree of flexibility in 
adapting to the client, multitasking staff and a focus on the innovative development of 
products or services, increases their competitiveness. The internet, however, also brings 
some negative aspects, such as the higher exposure of SMEs’ IS to attacks and threats of 
the internet space (Osborn 2015).
Regarding the relationship between SMEs and cybersecurity, this can be described as 
controversial (Ponsard, Grandclaudon, and Dallons 2018; Osborn 2015; Sangani and 
Vijayakumar 2012). First, most small and medium-sized businesses feel that IS security is 
not their primary concern, which is reflected in minimal annual cybersecurity budgets 
(Osborn 2015). This is due to the fact that SME managers evaluate that the level of risk is 
very low as compared with large companies, therefore having a false sense of security 
(Osborn 2015; Valli, Martinus, and Johnstone 2014). Moreover, in most situations, Osborn 
(2015) finds that SMEs do not have clear steps to implement cybersecurity processes due 
to the diversity and number of devices,5 which, together with low adherence to proce-
dures and standards, makes the implementation of standards an impossible task (Ponsard, 
Grandclaudon, and Dallons 2018; Sangani and Vijayakumar 2012).
However, the literature shows that SMEs have a high level of risk, noting that approxi-
mately more than half of attacks are directed at them (Aguilar 2015; Osborn 2015). Hayes 
and Bodhani (2013) point out that the main reason for this is that SMEs are easy targets 
with a good value versus risk ratio, and therefore they receive a variety of attacks. First, 
SMEs are falling victim to automated attacks as a result of their online presence. These 
usually consist of phishing (or spear-phishing) emails to lure victims to fake sites that will 
instal malware (Wright et al. 2014). There are also botnet infections, where devices in SMEs 
get infected and become part of a botnet controlled by a command and control (C&C) 
server (Garre, Pérez, and Ruiz-Martínez 2021). Second, SMEs receive attacks as inputs to 
larger targets (Ponsard, Grandclaudon, and Dallons 2018; Sangani and Vijayakumar 2012). 
That is, the adversaries know that there is the possibility that smaller partners are the 
weakest link to get to a larger organisation, as information exchanges can spread across 
several entities – for example, when these SMEs are a supplier of large companies (Sung, 
Kim, and Chang 2018). Finally, another type of attack is based on the use that SMEs make 
of their computing resources (Jang-Jaccard and Nepal 2014). As we have previously 
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pointed out, since SMEs do not consider themselves to be a target of computer attacks, 
they neglect procedures, implementation and awareness of possible attacks, allowing 
adversaries to exploit the vulnerabilities of these companies.
2.3 Research model
As mentioned above, our research looks at both breach types and their effect on SMEs. 
Based on a cause-effect analysis, our research model is shown in Figure 1.
● First, after identifying the type of breaches suffered by SMEs, we will determine the 
severity of the breaches.6 As we have previously pointed out, we consider that not all 
breaches have the same degree of severity for the company. To estimate severity, the 
literature uses two types of variables (Conteh and Schmick 2016; Heartfield et al. 
2018). The first is the service replacement time (disruption time), with the most severe 
attacks being those that require the most time to normalise the service in the 
company. The second is the cost of the breaches for the firm. Couce-Vieira, Insua, 
and Kosgodagan (2020) and the Cyber Security Breaches Survey (2017) pointed out 
that the cost of breaches7 includes estimates of the lost business costs, improve-
ments and implementation of software, and systems costs, and extra expenses on 
staff and expert advice costs.
● Second, regarding the effect that breaches have on SMEs, following Couce-Vieira, 
Insua, and Kosgodagan (2020), we consider that these have economic, financial and 
management implications for the company. Thus, financial and economic cost impli-
cations range from the loss of revenue, or the increase in costs as a consequence of 
hiring additional staff, to implications in the image and management of the com-
pany, such as the need to inform customers or stakeholders, or the introduction of 
new measures needed to prevent or protect against future breaches. Additionally, 
Couce-Vieira, Insua, and Kosgodagan (2020) pointed out that breaches have an 
impact on other types of intangible assets such as corporate reputation. For exam-
ple, a Forbes Insights (2014) report indicates that 46% of organisations had suffered 
reputational and brand equity damage as a result of an attack. Moreover, Couce- 
Vieira, Insua, and Kosgodagan (2020) pointed out that the impact of breaches not 
only affects the company but also has implications for its stakeholders, highlighting 
the importance of knowing how to correctly manage the information transmitted to 
customers and shareholders. Also, Ekelund and Iskoujina (2019) highlight the 
Figure 1. Research model: breaches and the effect in the SMEs.
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responsibility that companies have to their clients and to the administration, which 
can translate into compensation and associated costs.8 Therefore, breaches not only 
have economic, financial and management implications for the company but also 




In this study, the unit of analysis is the firm, and the data is collected from the Cyber 
Security Breaches Survey (2016, 2017). The Cyber Security Breaches Survey is a survey of 
UK firms, commissioned by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), which is 
part of the National Cyber Security Programme. The data was collected by Ipsos MORI, 
together with the Institute for Criminal Justice Studies at the University of Portsmouth, 
following the standard of the Code of Practice for Official Statistics.
The sample was obtained using the government’s Inter-Departmental Business 
Register (IDBR), which includes UK firms across all sectors and is the main source for 
government surveys at the firm level and the compilation of national statistics. The final 
sample consisted of 1,348 UK SMEs. A random probability telephone survey of UK 
businesses was undertaken from 24 October 2016 to 11 January 20179 .
The survey was designed to collect information about a range of topics related to 
cybersecurity. First, the survey asked about firms’ perception of cybersecurity; for exam-
ple, their approach to the management of cybersecurity risks, their level of awareness, 
their attitude towards cybersecurity, their perception on the information and guidance 
available on cybersecurity, and the reasons why managers thought cybersecurity was 
important. Second, the survey covered topics related to firms’ own experiences with 
cybersecurity; for example, their previous experiences with cybersecurity breaches, the 
impact and nature of these breaches, and their managerial approach and expenditures on 
cybersecurity.
The questionnaire was developed by Ipsos MORI and the Institute for Criminal Justice 
Studies (ICJS) in three stages: The first stage consisted of a stakeholder workshop and 
interviews involving Government, business and cyber security provider representatives 
across 13 organisations.10 The objective of this stage was to clarify the key cyber security 
issues facing businesses today. The second stage consisted of cognitive testing interviews 
with 10 businesses. This stages was intended to test comprehension of the new questions 
for 2017 and any technical terms used (e.g. ransomware). The last stages was a pilot 
survey, consisting of 30 interviews.
2.4.2. Measures
The first group of variables identifies the types of breaches in companies. To do this, and 
in line with our research model (Figure 1), we use two variables: typology and frequency of 
the breaches.
● The first variable measures the typology of the most frequent breaches (BREACHES) in 
companies. The questionnaire considers that breaches can be produced both by 
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external hacker attacks through malware, phishing or spam, as well as by insider 
incidents derived from the incorrect use of information systems or sabotage situa-
tions. The Cyber Security Breaches questionnaire asks the following question: Have 
any of the following happened to your organisation in the last 12 months? The 
questionnaire measures this variable with eight items (see Table).
● The second variable measures the frequency (FREQUENCY) of the occurrence of 
breaches in companies. For this, the questionnaire asks the following question: 
Approximately, how often in the last 12 months did you experience any of the cyberse-
curity breaches or attacks you mentioned? Table shows the results of the survey.
The second group of variables measures the severity of the breaches. For this, and in line 
with the literature, we have used three variables:
● The first variable is a subjective measure of the company’s perception of the most 
disruptive breach based on the breach’s typology, as defined in the questionnaire. To 
do this, the questionnaire asks the following question: I would like you to think about 
the one cybersecurity breach, or related series of breaches or attacks, that caused the 
most disruption to your organisation in the last 12 months. Table collects the results of 
the responses.
● The second variable measures the severity of the breaches by the time of disruption 
(TIME), in which the firms recover their services. The questionnaire asks the following 
question: As far as you know, how long was it, if any time at all, between this breach or 
attack occurring and is it identified as a breach? The answers are displayed in Table.
● The last variable measures the cost of cybersecurity breaches (COSTS) for firms. The 
questionnaire asks the following question: Approximately how much, if anything, do 
you think the cybersecurity breaches or attacks you have experienced in the last 
12 months have cost your organisation financially? This includes both direct and 
indirect costs or damages. Table shows the distribution of expenses based on the 
number of SMEs.
The last variable measures the impact of the breaches in SMEs. With this variable, we 
measure the impact of breaches on the company in financial, management and economic 
terms, also considering the responsibility that the firm has to its environment.
● Regarding the measurement of the impact of breaches (IMPACT) on SMEs, the 
questionnaire asks the following multi-item question (Table): And have any of 
these breaches or attacks impacted your organisation in any of the following 
ways?
2.4.3. Robustness of survey
Following the method of Podsakoff et al. (2003), the robustness of the survey has been 
tested through the common method variance (CMV). This analysis reveals six distinct 
latent constructs that account for 69.02% of the variance. The first factor accounts for 
17.35% of the variance, which is below the recommended limit of 50%. This result 
suggests CMV is not a concern in the results of our survey.
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2.4.4. ANN: procedure and design
In this paper, we estimate the research models, using an artificial neural network (ANN). 
This statistical model mimics biological neural networks to model complex patterns and 
prediction problems, allowing the analysis and prediction of complex relationships (non- 
linear and multiple interactions) in causal studies (Arranz and Fernandez de Arroyabe 
2010; Somers and Casal 2009). The ANNs are models that employ parallel information- 
processing structures for interpreting outcomes. At the same time, they are capable of 
adjusting their framework to increase the reliability of the model (Minbashian, Bright, and 
Bird 2010).
Regarding the typology of ANNs, for this application, we have used the multilayer 
perceptron (MLP) (Figure 2). Given the particular purposes of the application, the 
MLP model usually leads to the most satisfactory results, as reported in Bourilkov 
(2019). In MLP, neurons are organised in several layers, the first one being the input 
layer and the last one the output layer. Between input and output layers there could 
be several other hidden layers (Figure 2). The number of hidden layers has an 
important role in determining the generalisation ability of the MLP (Minbashian, 
Bright, and Bird 2010).
For the ANN-MLP design procedure, we propose five steps to design the ANN-MLP 
architecture, following the works of Wang (2007) and Ciurana, Quintana, and Garcia- 
Romeu (2008), as can be seen in Table 1.
Regarding the design of the ANN-MLP architecture for the analysis, we have estab-
lished the following causal models with the objective to answer the research questions 
(RQs) posed.
● Research question (RQ1): Model 1 determines the severity of breaches in SMEs. As an 
input variable we have the breaches typology (BREACHES), and as an output variable 
both the cost of the breaches (COSTS) and the disruption time (TIME).
● Research question (RQ2): Model 2 simulates the impact of breaches (IMPACT) in SMEs. 
The input variable is the breaches typology (BREACHES) and the output variable the 
impact of the breaches (IMPACT).
Figure 2. ANN Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) architecture. Source: Manning, Sleator, and Walsh (2014)
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Following Wang (2007), and Arranz and Fernandez de Arroyabe (2010), this paper 
uses a trial and error procedure for the design of the ANN-MLP architecture. The 
structure has been selected after having tested the ANN-MLP configurations with 
a different number of hidden layers, different number of neurons for each level, and 
different activation functions. While the number of inputs and outputs of the 
proposed network is given by the number of available input and output variables, 
the number and size of hidden layers is determined by testing several combinations 
of the number of hidden layers and the number of neurons. Master (Masters 1993) 
and Bishop (1995) pointed out that the choice of an appropriate number of hidden 
neurons is important; if too few are used there would be few resources to solve the 
adjustment problem while the use of too many neurons would increase the training 
time and will cause over-fitting. In general, experimentation with different numbers 
of hidden layers and different units is the most common method, existing certain 
rules to limit the number of experiments. In this line, Ciurana, Quintana, and Garcia- 
Romeu (2008) and Mohrotra (1997) pointed out that for a function approximation 
a two-layer neural network is usually sufficient, to accurately model any type of 
function. Regarding the number of neurons in each hidden layer, Hegazy et al. (1994) 
proposed that the number of neurons should be 0.75 m or m, where m is the 
number of input neurons. Master (Masters 1993) established a rule that is based on 
the combination of input and output neurons. As a criterion, the number of units in 
the hidden layer should not exceed the number of input variables (Bishop 1995). An 
extremely small number of units in the hidden layer compared to the number of 
input variables does not usually give a good result (Masters 1993; Bishop 1995).
The results of the two architectures for the two models are shown in Table 2. For 
example, for Model 1, the structure is 9-7-7, which means that there are 9, 7 and 7 
neurons in the input, hidden and output layers respectively. For the hidden layer, the 
activation function was the hyperbolic tangent and for the output layer the identity 
function was employed. In Table 3, we show the various experiments. The initial 
criteria were to experiment with both one hidden layer and two hidden layers, and 
a maximum number of units in each hidden layer equal to the number of variable 
inputs.
3. Results and discussion
In terms of descriptive analysis, the sample is composed of 1,348 SMEs, of which 37.52% of 
the firms included have less than nine employees; a similar percentage (35.5%) corre-
sponds to firms with ten to 49 employees, and 26.9% from 50 to 249 employees. For the 
online services offered by the sampled companies, the questionnaire divides them into 
seven different categories, from emails, websites and social media sites to bank accounts 
Table 2. ANN-MLP architecture for interaction analysis.
Model Output variable ANN architecture Activation Functions Error
Model 1 Severity of the Breaches 9-7-7 ● Hyperbolic tangent
● Identity
Sum-Square
Model 2 Impact of the Breaches 9-9-11 ● Hyperbolic tangent
● Identity
Sum-Square
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for the clients. In general, the majority of the sampled firms provide online services that 
relate to emails (93.2%), followed by websites (86.1%), online bank payments (72.1%) and, 
to a lesser extent, the development of digital marketing via social network sites (59.1%). 
Finally, the results show a low level of activity of the sampled companies in online 
ordering, and paying or booking services (26.7%). In order to analyse the degree of 
integration for firms in the use of online services, the results show that in most cases, 
around 80% of the sample, companies simultaneously use between three and five online 
services. In particular, the use of email, websites, online bank payment and social network 
sites is evident in 34.1% of the firms. Moreover, we have performed an analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) to determine if there are significant differences between the firm size and 
integration of online services in SMEs. From our analysis, we observe that the level of 
integration of online services is not homogeneous in companies (ANOVA, significance 
level: .000), finding that there is a positive correlation between the largest number of 
online services integrated into the company and its size (correlation: .240; p < .001).
Table 4 shows the results of the breaches typology in the sample. First, from our results, 
we can confirm that SMEs are subject to a wide variety of attacks. From breaches 
produced by social engineering attacks, such as phishing; automated attacks, such as 
injecting ransomware with the aim of hijacking information; non-automated attacks, with 
malware aiming to penetrate the company’s network; or breaches produced by the 
improper use of the company’s assets. Therefore, despite the perception of many SME 
managers, SMEs are exposed to hacker attacks. Second, in terms of the typology of 
breaches in SMEs, our results show that the most commonly identified type of breaches 
(36.5%) is staff receiving a fraudulent email or being directed to fraudulent sites 
(BREACHES 6), followed by people impersonating their organisation via emails or online 
(17.7%) (BREACHES 5), and computers infected with other viruses, spyware or malware 
(17.4%) (BREACHES 2). Other types of breaches are much less commonly identified, with 
frequency rates below 10% in most of the cases. As we can see, the results are in line with 
previous studies (Wright et al. 2014), which point out that the main attacks have a social 
nature, and highlight the importance of this type of attack, which is based on a lack of 
procedures and a lack of knowledge of the company’s personnel of cybersecurity policies 
(Ponsard, Grandclaudon, and Dallons 2018). Moreover, we see how malware attacks have 
their importance in SMEs, in line with previous works (Valli, Martinus, and Johnstone 2014; 
Sangani and Vijayakumar 2012). Sangani and Vijayakumar (2012) and Osborn (2015) 
highlighted the lack of adequate protection of the IS in SMEs, either due to the diversity 
Table 4. Identification of breaches in SMEs*.
Variable Typology of Breaches Count %
BREACHES 1 Computers becoming infected with ransomware 141 10.5
BREACHES 2 Computers become infected with other viruses, spyware or malware 234 17.4
BREACHES 3 Attacks that try to take down your website or online services 60 4.5
BREACHES 4 Hacking or attempted hacking of online bank accounts 48 3.6
BREACHES 5 People impersonating your organisation in emails or online 238 17.7
BREACHES 6 Staff receiving fraudulent emails or being directed to fraudulent websites 492 36.5
BREACHES 7 Unauthorised use of computers, networks or servers by staff, even if accidental 39 2.9
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of devices or the lack of knowledge in their cybersecurity management; these are an 
important source of vulnerabilities in SMEs.
Table 5 displays the frequency of occurrence of the breaches experienced by SMEs. 
First, we observe that approximately 653 SMEs, 48.4% of the sample, have responded to 
this question, which suggests that over half of the SMEs sampled are not aware of the 
breaches occurring in their companies. We have carried out a preliminary check to see if 
there are biases in the answers. In a similar way as in previous questions, we have 
performed an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to determine if there are significant differ-
ences between SMEs and the frequencies of breaches. The ANOVA results show 
a homogeneous behaviour, without there being significant differences in the SMEs, either 
due to the size of the company (ANOVA, significance level: .685) or the number of online 
services integrated into it (ANOVA, significance level: .227). Second, Table 4 shows that 
approximately 80% of the SMEs report having suffered attacks either only once or less 
than once per month at most, with daily or very frequent attacks representing only 10% of 
responses. Previous analysis of our results could indicate that the SMEs are not a target of 
cybersecurity attacks due to the infrequency of the breaches. However, if we consider that 
the most infrequent attacks are pointed out in the literature as being the most damaging 
to firms, our initial assumption must change. That is, attacks aimed at penetrating the 
company’s network have the characteristic of occurring in certain situations and with 
a very low level of frequency (Conteh and Schmick 2016; Gatrner Group 2014; Peggy et al., 
2011). In this same line, we can place the threats produced by the employees from the use 
of the company’s devices, or the fraudulent use of these. Moreover, automated attacks 
without a defined objective are constantly present, with a high frequency. In this line, 
Walli et al. (Valli, Martinus, and Johnstone 2014) point out that these attacks are usually 
easily detected by the conventional protection systems, without causing significant 
damage to companies.
In order to examine the behaviour pattern of breaches in SMEs, we have performed an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) to see if there are differences based on the frequency of 
occurrence in each type of breach (Table 6). To do this, we have created a variable, with 
a value of 1 if the attacks are infrequent (frequency between once and more than 
a month), and a value of 2 if the breaches are very frequent (if the frequency is between 
daily and a month). Firstly, we see that in BREACHES 1 and 2, which correspond to SME 
computers being infected with both ransomware and other types of viruses (spyware or 
malware), there are significant differences regarding the frequency of occurrence and, 
consequently, two different groups are generated in each type of breach. The first, the 
more infrequent group, corresponds in both types of breaches to approximately 75% of 
the cases in the sample, with the other group representing approximately 25% of the 
Table 5. Frequency of breaches in SMEs*.
Variables Frequency Count %
FREQUENCY 1 Once only 226 34.6
FREQUENCY 2 More than once but less than once a month 183 28.0
FREQUENCY 3 Roughly once a month 96 14.7
FREQUENCY 4 Roughly once a week 71 10.9
FREQUENCY 5 Roughly once a day 35 5.4
FREQUENCY 6 Several times a day 42 6.4
*Total: 653 SMEs
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cases, which occur with a daily to a monthly frequency. An interpretation of these two 
groups of breaches corresponds to non-automated attacks, which are more infrequent, 
but with more sophistication and tailored towards SMEs. This can be a case of ransom-
ware and also specific malware; this group of attacks are usually launched by motivated 
adversaries (financial gain mostly) (Sahoo and Gupta 2019; Heartfield et al. 2018) and are 
usually very harmful to SMEs. The second group corresponds to automated attacks that 
usually target a large sample of companies at the same time. These types of attacks tend 
to be less sophisticated since attackers try to infect as many systems as possible with 
exactly the same malware, which makes them ineffective or easily neutralised given the 
diversity of systems and security measures of SMEs (Osborn 2015). Secondly, the results 
show that also BREACHES 6, which corresponds to the SME staff receiving fraudulent email 
or being directed to fraudulent sites, displays significant differences in the frequency of this 
type of breach. In this case, about half of the breaches are infrequent, and the other half 
have a high frequency. As in the previous case, we can talk about targeted attacks (more 
infrequent), such as spear-phishing, in which the attacker has knowledge of the victims 
and tries to convince them to go to a fraudulent site using that familiarity, or automated 
attacks, generic and very frequent attacks, which are usually the classic phishing that most 
people receive (for example, a common one is an email about an HMRC tax refund, in 
which the attacker encourages the victim to follow a link to get a tax refund by inputting 
their bank account details).
3.1. The severity of the breaches
Regarding our first research question (the severity level of the breaches and what their effect 
on SMEs is), Table 7 collects the perception of SMEs with respect to the disruptiveness of 
breaches. Out of the responses obtained, the staff receiving fraudulent emails or being 
directed to fraudulent websites (BREACHES 6) is the most severe breach in the perception of 
SMEs, having a response greater than 10% (248 of SMEs: 18.4%), with the rest of the 
breaches having answers lower than 10%. First, we see that the results show a poor 
response, which we can interpret as a consequence of the scarcity of knowledge and 
consideration that cybersecurity has in SMEs, corroborating previous works (Ponsard, 
Grandclaudon, and Dallons 2018; Osborn 2015). Second, in line with Jensen et al. (2017) 
and Walli et al. (Valli, Martinus, and Johnstone 2014), the results point out that the most 
severe breaches in the perception of SMEs are those derived from social engineering 




BREACHES 1 8.806 .003 73.4 26.6
BREACHES 2 27.975 .000 75.9 24.1
BREACHES 3 2.826 .093 Non-significant
BREACHES 4 3.035 .082 Non-significant
BREACHES 5 .245 .621 Non-significant
BREACHES 6 91.584 .000 52.7 47.3
BREACHES 7 .038 .845 Non-significant
BREACHES 8 .381 .537 Non-significant
*Frequency between once and more than a month 
**Frequency between daily and a month.
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attacks, such as phishing. According to Liginlal, Sim, and Khansa (2009), these results are 
consistent with the fact that social engineering attacks are more visible to company 
management and noticeable to any company employee (other types, such as spyware, 
are more difficult to detect), considering that company managers make infrequent 
updates to their cybersecurity status (Cybersecurity Breaches, 2017). We can conclude 
that there is limited usefulness of subjective measures11 to analyse the severity of 
breaches in SMEs.
Complementary to this analysis, we have analysed the severity of the breaches using 
two objective measures, such as the disruption time produced by the breaches, and the 
cost that the breaches entail for SMEs. As in previous questions, we have carried out 
a confirmatory analysis, to check if in the response obtained there was a bias derived from 
the size or the online services of the SMEs, confirming that the response is homogeneous, 
as shown by the two variance analyses carried out for both variables (ANOVA, significance 
level: .244; significance level: .126). The results in Table 8 show the disruption time. We see 
that 91.4% of breaches are resolved in less than 24 hours. Less than 1% are those that last 
for more than one month. Regarding the cost of breaches (Table 9), the response of SMEs 
varies from a minimum amount to £100,000, with the average expense being approxi-
mately £2,000. Therefore, from our results, we see that the attacks received by SMEs are 
not very severe, combining both recovery time and cost, contradicting previous results 
that highlight the high level of severity of attacks, indicating that 60% of SMEs will 
disappear after six months.
In order to identify the typology of breaches and their severity, we have performed 
a causal analysis with an ANN multilayer perceptron (MLP). Figure 3 shows the architec-
ture of the neural network used to model the severity of attacks, using the types of 
breaches as input variables, and the disruption time and cost as output variables. We 
Table 7. Typology of breaches in SMEs and perception of the severity*.
Variable Typology of Breaches Count %
BREACHES 1 Computers becoming infected with ransomware 78 5.8
BREACHES 2 Computers become infected with other viruses, spyware or malware 126 9.3
BREACHES 3 Attacks that try to take down your website or online services 29 2.2
BREACHES 4 Hacking or attempted hacking of online bank accounts 22 1.6
BREACHES 5 People impersonating your organisation in emails or online 101 7.5
BREACHES 6 Staff receiving fraudulent emails or being directed to fraudulent websites 248 18.4
BREACHES 7 Unauthorised use of computers, networks or servers by staff, even if accidental 5 0.4




Table 8. The disruption time in the SMEs*.
Time disruption Count %
● Immediate 425 66.2
● Within 24 hours 162 25.2
● Within a week 40 6.2
● Within a month 9 1.4
● Within 100 days 4 .6
● Longer than 100 days 2 .3
*Total: 642 SMEs
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have previously considered the robustness of the model. Modelling with ANN-MLP shows 
an ability to predict both the cost and the disruption time, with an error of 23.8% in the 
case of the disruption time, and in the case of the cost with a continuous scale, it is 0.383. 
Moreover, the correlation between the expected and actual output variables is 0.633 and 
0.729, both for cost and disruption time. Therefore, we can point out high robustness or 
the explanatory capacity of the model.
Table 10 shows the normalised importance of the severity of breaches in the costs and 
disruption time. It is observed that BREACHES 7 (unauthorised use of computers, networks or 
servers by staff: 100%) is the one that produces the highest severity both in cost and 
disruption time. At a second level are BREACHES 4 (hacking or attempted hacking of online 
bank accounts: 64.1%) and BREACHES 8 (unauthorised use or hacking of computers, net-
works or servers by people outside your organisation: 60.5%). At a lower level are BREACHES 
6 (staff receiving fraudulent emails or being directed to fraudulent websites: 43.0%) and 
BREACHES 5 (people impersonating your organisation in emails or online: 38.6%). The rest of 
the breaches have a normalised impact of less than 30%. More in detail, in Table 11, we 
see the independent impact for each output variable. We see that there is a slight 
difference. Thus, regarding the cost of disruption, we see that the one with the greatest 
effect is BREACHES 3 (attacks that try to take down your website or online services: 100%), 
followed by BREACHES 7 (unauthorised use of computers, networks or servers by staff, even if 
accidental: 78.4%). Moreover, in the case of disruption time, it is BREACHES 7 (unauthorised 
use of computers, networks or servers by staff, even if accidental: 100%) which reports 
a greater effect here. Our results are in line with previous studies that highlight how direct 
attacks on the commercial and financial infrastructure of a company represent significant 
damage to firms (Lezoche and Panetto 2020; Heartfield, 2018; Chaudhry et al. 2011). 
Moreover, our results corroborate that the inappropriate use of SMEs’ devices has 
a greater severity, such as, for example, not having an appropriate password policy 
(password length and characters, together with the expiration of the passwords) and/or 
leaving an unprotected network due to improper use of safe environments, which allows 
the entry of attacks and loss of control, producing significant damage in terms of loss of 
business activities and information (ISO 2016; ISO/IEC 15,408–1: 2009, 2018). These results 
reinforce the need to establish appropriate cybersecurity policies, procedures, awareness 
and training in SMEs, together with cyber insurance cover to enable rapid business 
recovery, but also to update protection and security controls (ISO/IEC 15,408–1: 2009, 
2018; Cenfetelli and Bassellier 2009).
Therefore, as a discussion on what the degree of breach severity is in SMEs, our results 
show a low level of breach severity both in costs for the SMEs and in the time to solve the 
disruption. This may explain the controversial relationship between cybersecurity and 
SMEs, noted in the literature (Ponsard, Grandclaudon, and Dallons 2018; Osborn 2015; 
Table 9. The costs of the breaches in the SMEs*.
Costs (£) Frequency %
0 to 199 411 70.9
200 to 999 57 9.8
1,000 to 9,999 79 13.6
10,000 to 100,000 33 5.7
Total: 580 SMEs
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Sangani and Vijayakumar 2012). On the one hand, this low level of severity of our results, 
together with the scarcity of updates that managers make for cybersecurity problems 
(Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2017), may explain why SMEs do not feel like cyberattack 
targets. However, from our results, we see that SMEs are subject to all types of attacks. In 
line with Wright et al. (2014), phishing plays an important role in small and medium-sized 
companies, taking advantage of the low level of preparation of employees. Second, our 
results corroborate previous studies that SMEs receive attacks as inputs to larger targets 
(Ponsard, Grandclaudon, and Dallons 2018; Sangani and Vijayakumar 2012). Finally, the 
exposure of SMEs to the internet makes them subject to automatic attacks, corroborating 
previous studies that indicate their low degree of severity (Jang-Jaccard and Nepal 2014; 
Sangani and Vijayakumar 2012). Moreover, we must highlight the severity of breaches 
Figure 3. ANN Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) architecture for breaches and cost and time disruption.
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produced by the misuse of SMEs’ devices. In line with Osborn (2015) and Ponsard, 
Grandclaudon, and Dallons (2018), this last point reinforces the need for SMEs to adhere 
to international standards, for example, the family of ISO 27000s.
3.2. Impact of breaches in SMEs
Table 12 provides information on the second research question, how breaches impact on 
SMEs. The impact is considered in the survey as the reaction of the firm to the breaches, in 
terms of management, financial and economic impacts, involving both the company and 
its environment. As in previous questions, we have verified the existence of biases in the 
Table 10. The importance of the severity of the breaches in the costs and disruption time*.
Variables Typology of Breaches Value Normalise
BREACHES 1 Computers becoming infected with ransomware .064 28.8%
BREACHES 2 Computers become infected with other viruses, spyware or malware .063 28.1%
BREACHES 3 Attacks that try to take down your website or online services .064 28.6%
BREACHES 4 Hacking or attempted hacking of online bank accounts .143 64.1%
BREACHES 5 People impersonating your organisation in emails or online .086 38.6%
BREACHES 6 Staff receiving fraudulent emails or being directed to fraudulent websites .096 43.0%
BREACHES 7 Unauthorised use of computers, networks or servers by staff, even if accidental .223 100.0%
BREACHES 8 Unauthorised use or hacking of computers, networks or servers by people 
outside your organisation
.135 60.5%
*Simulation: ANN-MLP 9-7-7; Error (Costs): 0.383; Error (Time): 23.8%
Table 11. The importance of the severity of the breaches in the costs and disruption time*.
Variables Typology of Breaches
Time Disruption Costs
Value Normalise Value Normalise
BREACHES 1 Computers becoming infected with ransomware .050 19.8% .124 72.1%
BREACHES 2 Computers become infected with other viruses, spyware or 
malware
.045 17.9% .111 64.4%
BREACHES 3 Attacks that try to take down your website or online services .178 70.9% .172 100.0%
BREACHES 4 Hacking or attempted hacking of online bank accounts .194 77.4% .130 75.5%
BREACHES 5 People impersonating your organisation in emails or online .036 14.3% .098 57.0%
BREACHES 6 Staff receiving fraudulent emails or being directed to 
fraudulent websites
.042 16.6% .084 48.8%
BREACHES 7 Unauthorised use of computers, networks or servers by staff, 
even if accidental
.250 100.0% .135 78.4%
BREACHES 8 Unauthorised use or hacking of computers, networks or 
servers by people outside your organisation
.104 41.5% .112 65.2%
*Simulation: ANN-MLP 9-7-7; Robustness, Error (Costs): 0.383; Error (Time): 23.8%
Table 12. Impact of breaches in SMEs.
Variable Impacts Count %
IMPACT 1 Stopped staff from carrying out their day-to-day work 182 13.5
IMPACT 2 Loss of revenue or share value 31 2.3
IMPACT 3 Additional staff time to deal with the breach or attack. 247 18.3
IMPACT 4 Any other repair or recovery costs 120 8.9
IMPACT 5 New measures needed to prevent or protect against future breaches or attacks 264 19.6
IMPACT 6 Fines from regulators or authorities, or associated legal costs 0 0
IMPACT 7 Reputational damage 4 0.3
IMPACT 8 Prevented provision of goods or services to customers 24 1.8
IMPACT 9 Discouraged you from carrying out a future business activity you were intending to do 46 3.4
IMPACT 10 Complaints from customers 18 1.3
IMPACT 11 Goodwill compensation or discounts are given to customers 248 18.4
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responses, and we see that there are significant differences (ANOVA, significance level: 
.000), showing an increase in the response as the company has a larger size and more 
integrated online services. Furthermore, we can confirm that there is a positive correlation 
in the higher response as companies increase in size and the number of integrated online 
services. In line with previous studies, our results show that as dependence on online 
services increases, SME managers increase their interest and concern about cybersecurity. 
Regarding the results, Table 12 shows that the most common impacts of breaches in SMEs 
are IMPACT 5 (decision to implement new measures that prevent further attacks: 19.6%), 
IMPACT 3 (additional time from the staff to deal with the attack itself: 18.3%), as well as 
IMPACT 11 (compensations to customers: 18.4%) and IMPACT 1 (stopped staff from carrying 
out their day-to-day work: 13.5%). From our results, we can confirm that breaches have 
both economic and financial implications for companies, in terms of costs, customer 
compensation and denial of service (Pérez-González, Preciado, and Solana-Gonzalez 
2019; Jensen et al. 2017; Herath and Rao 2009; Liginlal, Sim, and Khansa 2009). 
Moreover, an important conclusion is that the existence of breaches produces 
a reaction in SMEs in terms of management to protect themselves against future attacks. 
This result is in line with the reactive role that SMEs play in terms of cybersecurity (Chan, 
Woon, and Kankanhalli 2005). However, unlike other studies, which have highlighted loss 
of reputation damage or legal costs as impacts, especially in large firms, we see from our 
results that in the case of SMEs these are insignificant (Forbes Insights 2014).
Regarding the causal effect that different types of breaches have on SMEs, Figure 4 
shows the ANN-MLP architecture of the causal relationship between breaches and their 
impact. The robustness of the model is high. Thus, it is observed that the prediction 
capacity of our model is greater than 85% in all cases, both for values 0 and 1, producing 
a robust model to predict the effects of attacks. Moreover, the correlation between the 
expected and actual output variables is higher than 0.750. These results show a high 
ability to predict, considering the model error.
Table 13 shows the normalised importance of the causal effect between the different 
breach typologies and the impact generated. From the results, we can conclude that 
breaches related to malware attacks have a greater impact on the economic losses of 
a company, both in terms of additional staff costs and service interruptions. On the other 
hand, SMEs introduce cybersecurity measures as a result of the existence of breaches 
derived from both malware attacks and the inappropriate use of IS facilities by staff. In this 
sense, Osborn (2015) and Sangani and Vijayakumar (Sangani and Vijayakumar 2012) have 
pointed out the reactive nature of SMEs in terms of their relationship with cybersecurity, 
which means that breaches are a driver in investment for security measures and the 
implementation of security standards. Moreover, in terms of image, and relationships with 
clients and authorities, breaches related to the misuse of IS are the ones that have the 
most impact (Couce-Vieira, Insua, and Kosgodagan 2020). Unlike hacker attacks that are 
easily understood by company stakeholders, cybersecurity problems caused by the 
inappropriate use of IS by company personnel, with the consequent problems of opera-
tion and responsibility, require in many cases financial compensation or a thorough 
explanation (Couce-Vieira, Insua, and Kosgodagan 2020; Posey, Roberts, and Lowry 
2015), which result in losses of corporate reputation and demotivation to start new 
businesses. These highlight the need for additional cover for security incidents, which 
could be solved by having cyber insurance cover.
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Finally, from our results, it can be confirmed that breaches have an effect on SMEs in 
economic, financial and management terms. While previous work highlighted operational 
and technical problems (Sahoo and Gupta 2019; Valli, Martinus, and Johnstone 2014), our 
results confirm the economic and financial effects that breaches have in terms of lost 
revenue. Moreover, our results are in line with previous works that highlight the effect 
that breaches produce in the relationship with clients and with the administration (Couce- 
Vieira, Insua, and Kosgodagan 2020), especially in the case of misuse of the IS of SMEs. 
Figure 4. ANN Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) architecture for breaches and impacts.
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Lastly, the results differ in terms of the impact they have on corporate reputation (ENISA 
2020; Gatrner Group 2014).
4. Conclusion
Our paper has analysed the cyber breaches produced in SMEs, as well as their effect and 
severity in management, economic and financial terms. We have combined statistical 
analysis with the use of machine learning, using a causal analysis to model the effect of 
breaches in SMEs.
From a cybersecurity point of view, our first group of contributions extends the 
literature on SMEs’ security (Müller, Buliga, and Voigt 2018; Ponsard, Grandclaudon, and 
Dallons 2018; Hayes and Bodhani 2013). Firstly, we extend previous works confirming that 
SMEs are targets of cyberattacks either directly or as part of the supply chain of other 
larger companies. Thus, SMEs receive a wide variety of breaches, through malware in 
automated and non-automated attacks, followed by attacks of a social nature (social 
engineering), exploiting staff vulnerabilities, even those derived from the misuse of the IS 
in SMEs. Secondly, unlike previous works, we have characterised the degree of severity of 
breaches in SMEs, based on disruption time and their cost. Our last contribution consists 
of determining the effect of breaches in SMEs in economic, financial and management 
terms, highlighting the differential aspects concerning large companies.
From a policy-making point of view, our work highlights the need to develop adequate 
policies and procedures in SMEs for the development of cybersecurity systems in con-
junction with appropriate training and awareness campaigns. Firstly, unlike previous 
studies that justified the non-existence of protection methods against possible cyberat-
tacks and threats, based on the consideration that SME managers have of cybersecurity, as 
well as the little adherence that SMEs have to the application of policies, and finally the 
diversity of IS in them, we consider the need to adhere to these types of standards or best 
practices of security in companies. Secondly, we highlight the importance of breaches 
derived from the misuse of IS in SMEs by their staff. Therefore, we consider a crucial 
element is to involve SME employees in training and awareness campaigns, which will 
reduce breaches that occur in this way. Finally, we highlight the need to involve SME 
managers in decisions to invest in cybersecurity systems and cyber insurance, stressing 
the problems that this may entail for the company, not only in terms of cost and denial of 
services, but also in responsibilities with its stakeholders and loss of corporate reputation.
Our last contribution is framed from a methodological point of view. We consider that 
the use of statistical methods, in particular, machine learning techniques, allows us to 
identify the cause-effect relationships between breaches and their impact on SMEs. Firstly, 
the use of statistical techniques and adequate surveys allows us to characterise the 
behaviour of companies in terms of cybersecurity. Secondly, the use of machine learning 
is very appropriate in the field of cybersecurity, where the lack of information from 
company managers and correlation problems between variables is common, allowing 
us to obtain robust modelling of the relationships between variables.
Finally, like any other, our study is not free from limitations. First, although our study uses an 
important and significant sample, perhaps later studies should expand the sample to different 
countries, testing the non-existence of bias in our results. Also, although our study used the 
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Cyber Breaches Innovation Survey as a questionnaire, subsequent studies should focus on 
other alternative measures to test the results and avoid possible measurement biases.
Notes
1. Insurance and financial institutions use it as part of the liability of a company to be able to 
recover from a cyber breach or the likelihood of a company having a cyber breach (ABI 2020).
2. In line with the Cybersecurity Breaches Survey (2017), which indicates that approximately less 
than 15% of managers receive daily or weekly updates on cybersecurity in companies in the 
UK. Cybersecurity has been focused on IT departments, with little relation to the rest of the 
company.
3. A cyberattack is a set of offensive actions against information systems, producing a security 
incident in the firm (CLUSIF 2008).
4. Adversaries, in this context, could be anything from competitors, to nation states or nation 
state sponsored hackers, to financially motivated individuals (Chaudhry et al. 2011).
5. Osborn (2015) highlighted that SMEs have an average of 2.92 devices, with desktops being 
the most used, followed by smartphones and tablets. For internet access, this study indicates 
that ADSL modems, ADSL wireless and 3 G/4 G wireless are the most used systems; however, 
a high level of ignorance of the different connection possibilities stands out. Regarding 
protection systems, the study indicates that the main cybersecurity countermeasures are 
firewalls, virus scanners, malware scanners and spam killers; however, regarding the main-
tenance of cybersecurity system updates, a high percentage of SMEs were unaware of how 
frequent these updates needed to be.
6. Ifinedo’s (2012) concept of perceived severity of an attack and breaches refers to the differ-
ences in the degree of seriousness by which attacks and threats are perceived and in the 
potential harm of the attack. In the context of the firm and, particularly, for IT systems, this 
potential harm can be measured in terms of the costs and legal liability for the company.
7. According to Kaspersky Lab (2017), cyberattacks cost an average of $1.3 million per business 
in 2017 in North America, 11% more than in 2016. For SMEs, the average cost of recovery 
amounts to $117,000.
8. For example, when a company suffers a data breach, following GDPR, the Information 
Commissions Office (ICO) can fine a said SME 10 million euros (or the equivalent in sterling), or 
2% of the total annual worldwide turnover in the preceding financial year, whichever is higher.
9. Obtaining the data through a telephone survey has some advantages. First, the use of 
random-probability sampling to avoid selection bias. Second, the inclusion of micro and 
small businesses, which ensures that the findings are representative of the whole UK business 
population and not skewed towards larger businesses. And finally, a telephone data collec-
tion approach, which aims to also include businesses with less of an online presence 
(compared to online surveys).
10. The stakeholders were: The Cabinet Office, The Centre for the Protection of National 
Infrastructure (CPNI), Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), The Home Office, 
6 UK industry representative bodies, and 3 professional cyber security or software organisations.
11. In this paper we differentiate between subjective and objective. While subjective is based on 
the response perceived by the manager, objective refers to the response measure using cost 
and time of disruption.
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